Atmatattvaviveka (also written as Atma Tattva Viveka) is a Nyaya text by Udayanacharya (1050 – 1100 CE). Atmatattvaviveka was published in the Bibliotheca Indica Edition, Calcutta (now Kolkata) in 1939. A summary of the work by V Varadacari was published in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. II, edited by K.H.Potter. Udayanacharya was born in the village of Kariona in Mithila and was a dynamic acharya in the Nyaya system of philosophy. He entered into philosophical disputations with the Vedic, non-Vedic and Buddhist scholars.
Atmatattvaviveka has a two-fold aim of refuting Buddhist
arguments against the theory of eternity of atman (the self) and of
establishing the eternity of the self by an erudite survey and examination of
the limitations of the theory of momentariness.
Atmatattvaviveka is divided into four sections.
Kshana Bhangavada – This deal with the Buddhist theory – according
to which whatever exists is momentary. Udayana shows the logical, epistemological
and practical difficulties in accepting everything as momentary and establishes
that even momentariness cannot be proved if the perpetuality of the self is not
accepted as the ontological and epistemological basis of existence.
Bahyartha Bhangavada – This is the Buddhist theory according
to which existences, independent of judgement, do not have any existence even
of a momentary character. They have no existence in themselves apart from the
judgment. By making a subtle inquiry into the nature of judgement, external
existence and the relation between the two, Udayana comes to the conclusion that
the Buddhist’s arguments are based on fallacious reasoning and logical and epistemological
confusions as they treat the real world of existence with indifference.
Gunagunibhedabhanga – Udayana critically analyzes the
Buddhist’s position of the denial of difference between a particular, a quality
and a substance having that quality. Udayana says that there is difference between
qualities which are subordinated to the self and the self which subordinates
them. They are different entities and, if they are accepted as non-different,
they will not be determined so and then it will be contradictory not only to
their definition but also to our experiences.
Anupalambha – To the Buddhists’ objection that the self is
non-apprehended and what is not apprehended cannot be accepted, Udayana replies
that there are a number of entities which are not apprehended like the self but
their existence is not to be denied but rather proved by arguments. The self is
proved by perception as the ontological substratum of knowledge of pleasure,
pain, effort, etc. It is known as yogic perception, established by inference as
the cognitive basis of the function of the senses and ultimately by shruti
(apta vacana, statement of a knowledgeable/realized person), which propounds
the self as the ultimate reality to be realized by utmost effort.