Arthapatti is postulation or assumption of an explanatory fact (arthakalpana). Arthapatti or implication (also translated as presumption or postulation) is an independent means of knowledge according to Mimamsakas and Advaitins. Where an observed phenomenon cannot be explained without postulating or implying another phenomenon, the explanatory phenomenon is known through implication.
In the example of a person known to be alive but not found
at home, the doubt arises as to his existence itself. It is by implication of
his existence outside that the doubt is removed. According to Prabhakara, this
involves three steps –
- The perception of the fact that the man is not in the house
- Till it is known that man exists somewhere outside; it is a matter of doubt whether he is alive or not
- It is discovered that he lives somewhere outside and the doubt regarding his existence itself ceases.
Kumarila opines that it is the apparently inconsistent facts,
not doubts that are reconciled by implication. The knowledge that a person is
known to be alive and yet not to be at home has an apparent conflict, resolved
only by implication of his being somewhere outside.
According to Kumarila, every means of knowledge has an
element of implication in it. For example, the capacity to burn is implied in
the perceived fact of fire burning, power of motion in the different positions of
sun inferred, etc.
Advaitins are in agreement with the basic position of the
Mimamsakas.
Arthapatti is of two kinds – implication from the perceived
and implication from the verbally cognized. The former operates in cases of
illusion like the shell being mistaken for silver. When the silver is sublated
by the true cognition of shell, the situation is unintelligible unless it is assumed
that the silver is an illusory projection.
The second variety operates in cases of statements like – ‘He
who knows the self crosses sorrow ‘ where the sentence itself is unintelligible,
unless it is, by implication, granted that sorrow is illusory. This is because knowledge
does not remove real things but only illusions.
The second variety is again two fold – with reference to an
expression and with reference to the expressed. When the word ‘door’ is uttered,
it has to be made intelligible by implication of another word like ‘close’.
This is the first kind. In the textual statement – one who desires heaven must
perform Jytoistoma ritual. It is known by implication that by the ritual an
unseen potency called Apurva is generated which then leads one to heaven. The
ritual itself is not seen to produce this result of heaven immediately. This is
the second variety.
Naiyayikas do not accept arthapatti as an independent means
of knowledge and reduce it to the type of inference called kevala-vyatireki.
But Advaitins and Mimamsakas reduce this kevala-vyatireki inference itself to
arthapatti. The kevala-vyatireki inference is formulated in the Nyaya system is
an example as follows – whatever is not different from other elements has no
smell – Earth has smell – therefore, earth is different from other elements.
Advatins show that this can be an instance of arthapatti
like – earth could not intelligibly have a quality not present in the other
elements, without being different from those elements. Similarly, a person
cannot intelligibly be stout while not eating, neither at day time, nor at
night. Advaitins use implication to show that the world is maya. Without
assuming maya, the world will never be understood since it defies every other
explanation by known causes.